Risk of symptomatic COVID-19 due to aircraft transmission: a retrospective cohort study of contact-traced flights during England's containment phase. by Blomquist, Paula Bianca et al.
Influenza Other Respi Viruses. 2021;00:1–9.    |  1wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/irv
 
Received: 1 December 2020  |  Revised: 9 January 2021  |  Accepted: 12 January 2021
DOI: 10.1111/irv.12846  
O R I G I N A L  A R T I C L E
Risk of symptomatic COVID- 19 due to aircraft transmission: 
a retrospective cohort study of contact- traced flights during 
England’s containment phase
Paula Bianca Blomquist1,2  |   Hikaru Bolt3 |   Simon Packer4 |   Ulf Schaefer5 |   
Steven Platt6 |   Gavin Dabrera6 |   Maya Gobin4 |   Isabel Oliver6
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2021 The Authors. Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
1UK Field Epidemiology Training 
Programme, Public Health England, London, 
United Kingdom
2North West Field Services, National 
Infection Service, Public Health England, 
Liverpool, United Kingdom
3South East and London Field Services, 
National Infection Service, Public Health 
England, London, United Kingdom
4South West Field Services, National 
Infection Service, Public Health England, 
Bristol, United Kingdom
5Core Bioinformatics Group, Data and 
Analytical Sciences, National Infection 
Service, Public Health England, London, 
United Kingdom
6National Infection Service, Public Health 
England, London, United Kingdom
Correspondence
Paula Bianca Blomquist, Public Health 
England, London, United Kingdom.
Email: Paula.blomquist@phe.gov.uk
Abstract
Background: Knowledge gaps remain regarding SARS- CoV- 2 transmission on flights. 
We conducted a retrospective cohort study to estimate risk of acquiring sympto-
matic SARS- CoV- 2 on aircraft, to inform contact tracing and infection control efforts.
Methods: We identified co- passengers of infectious passengers on 18 England- 
bound flights from European cities up to 12/03/2020, using manifests received for 
contact tracing. Infectious passengers were laboratory- confirmed cases with symp-
tom onset from 7 days before to 2 days after the flight. Possible aircraft- acquired 
cases were laboratory- confirmed with onset 3- 14 days post- flight with no known 
non- flight exposure. Manifests was merged with the national case management data-
set (identifying cases, onset dates, contact tracing status) and the national COVID- 19 
linelist. Contact tracing notes were reviewed to identify non- flight exposures. We 
calculated attack rates (ARs) among all co- passengers and within subgroups, includ-
ing by distance from infectious cases and number of infectious cases on- board.
Results: There were 55 infectious passengers and 2313 co- passengers, includ-
ing 2221 flight- only contacts. Five possible aircraft- acquired cases were identified; 
ARs of 0.2% (95%CI 0.1- 0.5) among all flight- only contacts and 3.8% (95%CI 1.3- 
10.6) among contact- traced flight- only contacts sat within a two- seat radius. The 
AR among 92 co- travellers with known non- flight exposure to infectious cases was 
13.0% (95%CI 7.6%- 21.4%). There were insufficient numbers to assess differences 
between subgroups.
Conclusion: We conclude that risk of symptomatic COVID- 19 due to transmission on 
short to medium- haul flights is low, and recommend prioritising contact- tracing of 
close contacts and co- travellers where resources are limited. Further research on risk 
on aircraft is encouraged.
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1  | BACKGROUND
The COVID- 19 pandemic is a global health emergency,1 with more 
than 100 million cases reported worldwide by the end of January 
2021.2 During the containment phase in England (up to 12th March 
2020),3 Public Health England (PHE) implemented control measures 
to prevent case importation. In addition to supported isolation of 
travellers from high- incidence areas, PHE followed an air travel 
contact- tracing protocol similar to that of other respiratory infec-
tions, which involved identifying cases with recent flight history and 
liaising with port health authorities and airline companies to identify 
their contacts.4 Where reachable, contacts were put under passive 
surveillance for 14 days from the day of the flight, and, if they devel-
oped symptoms, asked to inform PHE and call NHS 111 to get tested. 
In doing this, PHE defined an air travel contact as a person sitting 
within a two seat radius of a confirmed case, or a member of cabin 
crew serving the area around where the case was seated.4
The magnitude and determinants of risk of SARS- CoV- 2 trans-
mission on aircraft continue to be of public and policy interest. The 
international aviation industry assesses risk to be low,5 pointing to 
high- efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters installed on aircraft, ver-
tical air flow, and seats acting as physical barriers. Published stud-
ies have varied in their risk assessment. There were no secondary 
cases identified among 350 co- passengers of an infectious case on 
a 15 hours flight between Wuhan China and Toronto Canada,6 or 
among 326 co- passengers monitored in the Northern Territory of 
Australia.7 However a case who flew from Central African Republic 
to France in February 2020 was identified as possibly aircraft- 
acquired,8 whole- genome sequencing has suggested direct trans-
mission between two passengers and two crew members on a 
15 hour flight from Boston to Hong Kong,9 and there were 16 pos-
sible secondary cases identified after exposure on a 10 hours com-
mercial flight from London to Vietnam – an attack rate of 62% in the 
business class section.10 A review of SARS case reports of in- flight 
transmission during the 2003 pandemic found two flights where half 
of secondary SARS cases were sat beyond the two- row limit, which 
equated to a total 26% attack rate among passengers sat within two 
rows of the infectious individual and 7% among passengers sat be-
yond this.11 A Lancet meta- analysis determined that infection risk 
due to physical contact with a contagious person was 13%, and this 
notably decreased with additional each metre of distance.12
This study aimed to estimate the risk and modifiable risk factors 
of symptomatic COVID- 19 due to transmission on aircraft, to inform 
contact- tracing methods, infection prevention and control efforts, 
as well as travel- related policy and guidance more widely.
2  | METHODS
2.1 | Study setting and period
This was a retrospective cohort study based on contact- traced in-
ternational aircrafts that flew to England during the containment 
period, which occurred between early January and March 12th 
2020. Only flights with an available manifest and a known seat num-
ber of any presumed infectious cases were included.
2.2 | Case definitions
Index cases were passengers with a laboratory- confirmed SARS- 
CoV- 2 test with symptom onset between seven days before or up to 
two days after an international flight.
Cases among flight contacts with symptom onset (or specimen 
date if symptom dates were missing) between 3 and 14 days after 
the flight were considered “additional cases.” These were subcate-
gorised as follows:
• Possible aircraft- acquired case: confirmed case among co- 
passengers whose only known exposure to the case was on the 
flight and had no whole- genome sequencing evidence to rule out 
direct transmission.
• Multiple- exposure case: confirmed case among co- passengers 
with evidence of household or other travel contact with an index 
case, as indicated in contact- tracing records or by having the same 
traveller information in the flight manifest as an index case (same 
personal contact email, record locator code, or booking reference 
number in the manifest).
All cases were presumed to be symptomatic, even where onset 
dates were missing, due to testing criteria at the time. Multiple- 
exposure cases were considered more likely to acquire infection 
from an index case during close contact outside the flight. We as-
sume that passengers were not wearing masks during the flight due 
to this being in the early stages of the pandemic before mask wear-
ing was widespread.
2.3 | Data sources
We accessed and compiled data from the following sources:
2.3.1 | Airline manifests
Flight datasets shared by airlines with PHE, which contained passen-
ger names, demographics, home address, booking email addresses, 
booking reference numbers, and seat numbers.
2.3.2 | HPZone
The case management system used by all local PHE Health 
Protection Teams to record cases, contacts, and communications 
related to the case management or contact tracing. The data ex-
tracted included details of COVID- 19 test results, onset dates, and 
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contextual information such as contacts outside of flights or move-
ment between seats.
2.3.3 | PHE line list of COVID- 19 cases
A national line list of laboratory- confirmed cases in England reported 
to PHE, including specimen dates, names, and demographic details 
of confirmed cases.
2.3.4 | Contact- tracing logs and communications
Documentation created locally to facilitate the contact- tracing 
process, including logs of case seat numbers and emails exchanged 
between PHE staff to initiate and report progress on contact 
tracing.
2.3.5 | FlightAware.com
An online database of past international flights, including actual re-
corded length of flight and aircraft model.
2.3.6 | COG- UK data
Database of SARS- CoV- 2 sequences sequenced in England (data re-
lease COG20200601), maintained by the COVID- 19 Genomics UK 
consortium.
2.4 | Data collection and management
All available manifests were standardised and appended, then re-
stricted to passengers who had boarded the flight. The full manifest 
dataset was linked to HPZone data on name as well as date of birth 
and/or residential postcode to identify cases, onset dates, and per-
sons who were contact traced. Contact- tracing logs and communica-
tions were manually reviewed to fill in information gaps and identify 
persons with multiple- exposures, and FlightAware.com was queried 
for flight length per flight.
To capture further cases, the manifest dataset was then linked 
with the England COVID- 19 laboratory line list. Line list cases were 
considered matches if they matched the manifest record exactly 
on last name and date of birth/postcode, or, if the manifest did not 
include date of birth/postcode but they matched exactly on name 
alone and there was evidence of foreign travel to the country in 
question in HPZone records.
Microsoft Excel was used for data management where manual 
compilation of information was required. R version 3.5.3 was used 
for manipulation of datasets, including labelling of cases and expo-
sure categories.
2.5 | Whole- genome sequencing
COG- UK data were searched to identify pre- aligned sequences 
from pairs or groups of index and possible aircraft- acquired cases 
who shared a flight. Sequences from multiple- exposure cases from 
these flights or from other flights for which only sequences from 
index or only possible aircraft- acquired cases were available were 
selected as background sequences. Pangolin software was used to 
calculate global lineages, and a phylogenetic tree generated with 
iqtree2. Pairwise distances between sequences were further calcu-
lated using SNP- distances.
2.6 | Analysis
The number of additional cases with onset 3 to 14 days after the 
flight was presented overall and by onset date. Attack rates were 
calculated among all co- passengers and among those who were 
successfully contacted to inform them of the contact- tracing and 
surveillance procedures (referred to as “contact traced” hereafter). 
Possible aircraft- acquired cases were identified, taking into account 
WGS evidence where available, and risk of aircraft transmission 
was estimated among co- passengers whose only known exposure 
to the index case was on the flight. This was compared to attack 
rates among multiple- exposure contacts of index cases. Possible 
aircraft- acquired cases were described in terms of time, person, and 
place on the aircraft. Finally, a risk factor analysis was undertaken by 
presenting attack rates by distance from the index case, number of 
index cases on the flight or in close proximity, flight length, and city 
of departure.
2.7 | Ethical considerations
Data were collected for contact- tracing and health protection pur-
poses, falling under Regulation 3 of the Health Service (Control of 
Patient Information) Regulations 2002. Regulation 3 specifically re-
lates to communicable disease and other risks to public health and as 
such encompasses contacting activities.
3  | RESULTS
3.1 | Study population
Contact tracing was initiated for 45 flights that landed in England 
between 31 January and 12 March 2020. Full manifests with unique 
seat numbers, including at least one seat specified for an index 
case, were available for 18 flights. These flights departed from 
across Europe (Table 1), with a median flight time of 115 minutes 
(range 86 to 259 minutes). 2368 passengers were recorded to have 
boarded these flights, of whom 2213 had an available date of birth 
or postcode to allow matching with the COVID- 19 laboratory line list 
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(93.5%). Among those with available sex (n = 770) or age (n = 1009), 
64% (n = 496) were male, and the median age was 41 years (inter-
quartile range 28 to 53).
Fifty- five persons meeting the case definition of an index 
case were identified, including one person who tested positive in 
another country. No further index cases were identified through 
linkage with the national line list, although linkage verified all 54 
index cases tested in England. Forty index cases were symptom-
atic on the flight, and 15 developed symptoms in the two days 
after the flight.
Location of departure Flights Passengers
Index 
cases
Index cases per 
100 passengers
Austria (Innsbruck) 5 758 20 2.6
Germany (Berlin) 1 158 2 1.3
Italy 8 993 22 2.2
Milan 3 227 4 1.8
Turin 1 130 2 1.5
Verona 4 636 16 2.5
Spain (Tenerife) 1 181 1 0.6
Switzerland 2 129 8 6.2
Basel 1 103 1 1.0
Geneva* 1 26 7 26.9
Turkey (Istanbul) 1 149 2 1.3
Total 18 2368 55 2.3
*Incomplete manifest for one flight 
TA B L E  1   Number of flights, 
passengers, and COVID- 19 index cases 
on England- bound flights between 31 
January 2020 and 12 March 2020 contact 
traced by PHE for which manifests were 
available for analysis
F I G U R E  1   Epicurve of days from flight 
to onset date/specimen date in COVID- 19 
cases on analysed England- bound contact- 
traced flights between 31 January 2020 
and 12 March 2020, by case classification. 
Flight pseudonyms used
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Of the 2313 co- passengers, 2221 were flight- only contacts and 
92 were multiple- exposure contacts. Of the former group, 425 sat 
within two seats of an index case, thereby meeting the definition of 
an individual who should be contact traced based on the flight con-
tact alone. Of these, 79 (19%) persons were recorded in HPZone as 
successfully contact traced.
3.2 | Additional cases and attack rates
Among all 2,313 co- passengers, there were 17 COVID- 19 cases 
with symptom onset or specimen date 3 to 14 days after the flight 
(Figure 1; Table 2). Five of these cases were possible aircraft ac-
quired, among the 2,221 persons with flight- only contact: an attack 
rate of 0.2% (95% CI 0.1- 0.5). Restricting to those sat within two 
rows and contact traced, the attack rate increased to 3.8% (95% CI 
1.3- 10.6).
More than two thirds of additional cases (n = 12) were among 
multiple- exposure contacts, with evidence of close contact with 
the index case outside the flight: an attack rate of 13.0% (7.6- 21.4). 
Among close contacts who were followed up, one in two developed 
symptomatic COVID- 19.
3.3 | Whole- genome sequencing
A total of 107 sequences on nine flights were identified. No flights 
were identified on which sequences were available from both the 
index case and any of five of the possible aircraft- acquired cases, 
so this information could not be used to support or rule out direct 
transmission.
3.4 | Description of possible aircraft- acquired cases
The five possible aircraft- acquired cases were four males and one fe-
male ranging between 32 and 60 years of age, who travelled on four 
flights from Innsbruck, Geneva, and Milan. Their flight times ranged 
from 109 to 120 minutes. These persons were sat throughout the 
plane body, and at varying distances from the closest index case(s) 
(Figure 2): four were sat within two seats, and one was sat five rows 
away. Each of these flights had at least three index cases and at least 
one symptomatic index case.
3.5 | Risk factor analysis
Only one case was detected beyond the two- seat radius eligible for 
contact tracing and no meaningful difference in crude risk was found 
comparing to those sat within two seats (Table 3). There were no 
possible aircraft- acquired symptomatic cases among the 19 persons 
sat directly next to an index case, but only two of these persons 
were successfully contact- traced. Among contact- traced individuals, 
the attack rate was higher if sat within two seats of two index cases 
(6.2%) than if sat within two seats of one index case (2.1%), or within 
two seats of a symptomatic case compared to an asymptomatic 
case (3.9% vs 0.0%), however with notably overlapping confidence 
intervals.
Similarly, attack rates were higher in flights with more index 
cases, with no additional cases in the four flights with only one index 
case, three in the ten flights with two to four index cases (0.2% at-
tack rate), and two in the four flights with four or more index cases 
(0.4%). There were insufficient numbers or variation in flight length 
to observe patterns by flight length.
4  | DISCUSSION
In this study of flight, contact- tracing, and laboratory data of pas-
sengers on 18 England- bound aircraft, we identified 55 COVID- 19 
index cases presumed to be infectious during travel. There were 17 
further symptomatic COVID- 19 cases with symptom onset or speci-
men dates within 3 to 14 days after the flight. Only five of these 
individuals were possible aircraft- acquired cases, representing an 
TA B L E  2   Number and proportion of additional COVID- 19 cases among co- passengers of index cases on analysed England- bound 
contact- traced flights between 31 January 2020 and 12 March 2020
Total Sat within two seats
N Cases AR (%) [95%CI] N Cases AR (%) [95%CI]
All co- passengers
Total 2313 17 0.7 [0.5- 1.2] 480 10 2.1 [1.1- 3.8]
Contact traced 102 15 14.7 [9.1- 22.9] 91 9 9.9 [5.3- 17.7]
Flight- only contacts
Total 2221 5 0.2 [0.1- 0.5] 425 4 0.9 [0.4- 2.4]
Contact traced 79 3 3.8 [1.3- 10.6] 79 3 3.8 [1.3- 10.6]
Multiple- exposure contacts
Total 92 12 13.0 [7.6- 21.4] 55 6 10.9 [5.1- 21.8]
Contact traced 23 12 52.2 [33.0- 70.8] 12 6 50.0 [25.4- 74.6]
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attack rate of 0.2% among those whose only known encounter with 
the index case was on the flight, and 3.8% when further restrict-
ing to those who were contact- traced. Due to smaller numbers of 
those contact- traced, the latter estimate ranged from 1.3% to 10.5% 
(based on the attack rate confidence interval). These risks were con-
siderably lower than that of multiple- exposure contacts of the index 
case: 13.0% overall (95% CI 7.6 to 21.4%) and 52.2% (95%CI 22.0 to 
70.8%) among those contact- traced.
The five possible aircraft- acquired cases were sat on four of the 
18 flights studied, travelling from Innsbruck, Geneva, and Milan, 
and were sat between one row and five rows away from the closest 
index case. Due to small numbers, there was insufficient evidence 
of the relationship between risk of SARS- CoV- 2 acquisition and seat 
proximity, number of index cases on the flight or nearby, or whether 
a nearby index case was experiencing symptoms. Differences in 
case ascertainment prevent comparisons between those sat within 
and beyond a radius of two seats from the index case, as the former 
were eligible for close symptom monitoring and testing via contact 
tracing. There were no cases among those sat directly adjacent to a 
case, but only two persons sat adjacent to a case and were contact- 
traced. We note that several persons who sat adjacent to an index 
case were close contacts that were excluded from the risk factor 
analysis. Additionally, we could not assess the impact of flight time 
on risk, as all cases were on flights between 1.5 and 2.5 hours long, 
and not on shorter or longer flights.
This study benefits from a wealth of data collected for COVID- 19 
contact- tracing purposes, as well as a thorough method using both 
manual review and data linkage. In particular, this included the ex-
traction of onset dates (found in 59 of 72 cases), and identification 
of passengers who lived or travelled with an index case, by reviewing 
flight booking information in the manifest as well as contact- tracing 
notes. Due to linkage to the national line list using electronic air-
plane manifests, which typically contain accurate patient informa-
tion, we are reasonably confident that we identified most, if not all, 
laboratory- confirmed cases associated with these flights.
However, risk of transmission in this setting remains difficult to 
quantify, and under- ascertainment is a major limitation to this study. 
Our risk estimate does not represent total risk of acquiring infec-
tion, including asymptomatic cases, which could only be estimated 
if all passengers were systematically tested. It is likely that there 
were several undetected cases, including mildly symptomatic cases 
or persons not reached by contact tracing, who therefore did not 
know they were eligible for testing.13 Other cases may have been 
unknown to PHE due to onward travel and diagnosis abroad.
Misclassification of exposure may also have occurred: some 
“flight- only” cases or seat numbers may have been misidentified due 
to incomplete information on passenger interactions or movements. 
The majority of passengers who sat within two rows of an index 
case were not contact- traced, in part because contact tracing for 
some flights was ceased as England transitioned from containment 
to delay phase, and because contemporaneous guidance only con-
sidered a passenger to be infectious if symptomatic on the flight.4
On balance, it is likely that we have underestimated the number 
of passengers who were infected with SARS- CoV- 2, but among them 
we may have overestimated the number that were due to acquisi-
tion on aircraft. Acquisition of SARS- CoV- 2 may have occurred prior 
to departure, at other points during travel, or upon return.14 Pre- 
departure acquisition is particularly likely due to the high incidence 
in the departures cities at the time,15 and further indicated by the 
short time difference between flight and symptom onset for some 
of the cases, in particular the secondary case with symptoms on the 
third day after the flight on the Verona 4 flight.
We conclude that risk of symptomatic COVID- 19 due to transmis-
sion on short to medium haul flights is likely low, at approximately 3% 
but less than 10% if sat within two rows of an infectious individual. 
This is consistent with the low numbers of aircraft- acquired second-
ary cases seen in some other published contact- tracing analyses,6- 8 
although lower the 62% attack rate found in Khanh et al's10 study of 
a 10 hours flight. These differences may be because we investigated 
shorter flights, ruled out more close contacts from possible aircraft 
transmission, or had lower case ascertainment. Differences in air-
craft ventilation and filtering systems are also possible,16 although 
these details were unavailable for this study.
The risk identified in this paper is relevant to England's contain-
ment period, so may be higher than risk on flights later in the pan-
demic, due to measures taken within the aviation industry. Guidance 
F I G U R E  2   Seating arrangement of COVID- 19 cases on flights 
with possible aircraft transmission of SARS- CoV- 2, among analysed 
England- bound contact- traced flights between 31 January 2020 
and 12 March 2020, by case classification. Flight pseudonyms 
used. Seating area limited to area around cases and seats of other 
passengers not indicated
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developed by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control in spring 2020 
16 recommended that aircraft operators minimise in- flight service, 
install HEPA filters if not already in place, regularly disinfect aircraft, 
and encourage use of medical face masks and adherence to respi-
ratory etiquette and hand hygiene among passengers. Mask wear-
ing on flights has since been mandated on many airlines (examples 
in references 17- 19). Additionally, pre- departure negative COVID- 19 
PCR test results and “Fit- to- fly” certificates are required by several 
receiving countries,20- 22 with such testing becoming more readily 
available.23 True risk of both encountering and acquiring SARS- 
CoV- 2 from an infectious co- traveller may consequently be lower, 
although sensitivity of detecting in- flight transmission events may 
be improving in line with guidance for aircraft operators to ensure 
thorough record keeping of passenger information to facilitate con-
tact tracing.16
Eligible flight contacts
Eligible flight contacts with 
initiated contact- tracing
N Cases
AR (%) [95% 
CI] N Cases
AR (%) [95% 
CI]
Individual- level factors
Distance from closest index case
Beyond 3 rows 1465 1 0.1 [0- 0.4] 0 0
3 seats away 331 0 0.0 [0- 1.1] 0 0
2 seats away 270 3 1.1 [0.4- 3.2] 50 2 4.0 [1.1- 13.5]
1 seat away on 
different row
132 1 0.8 [0.1- 4.2] 27 1 3.7 [0.7- 18.3]
1 seat away on 
same row
23 0 0.0 [0.0- 14.2] 2 0 0.0 [0.0- 65.8]
Number of index cases within 2 seats
0 1796 1 0.1 [0.0- 0.3] 0 0
1 248 2 0.8 [0.2- 2.9] 47 1 2.1 [0.4- 11.1]
2 177 2 1.1 [0.3- 4.0] 32 2 6.2 [1.7- 20.1]
Symptoms of closest index case, among those with index case within 2 seats
Asymptomatic 90 1 1.1 [0.2- 6.0] 3 0 0.0 [0.0- 56.1]
Symptomatic 335 3 0.9 [0.3- 2.6] 76 3 3.9 [1.4- 11.0]
Flight- level factors
Number of index cases on flight
1 (4 flights) 458 0 0.0 [0.0- 0.8] 17 0 0.0 [0.0- 18.4]
2 to 4 (10 
flights)
1272 3 0.2 [0.1- 0.7] 34 1 2.9 [0.5- 14.9]
5+ (4 flights) 491 2 0.4 [0.1- 1.5] 28 2 7.1 [2.0- 22.6]
Length of flight
< 1.5 hours (1 
flight)
143 0 0.0 [0.0- 2.6] 0 0
1.5 to 2.5 hours 
(15 flights)
1754 5 0.3 [0.1- 0.7] 58 3 5.2 [1.8- 14.1]
4 to 5 hours (2 
flights)
324 0 0.0 [0.0- 1.2] 21 0 0.0 [0.0- 15.5]
Country of departure
Austria 724 3 0.4 [0.1- 1.2] 35 2 5.7 [1.6- 18.6]
Germany 155 0 0.0 [0.0- 2.4] 3 0 0.0 [0.0- 56.1]
Italy 898 1 0.1 [0.0- 0.6] 11 0 0.0 [0.0- 25.9]
Spain 177 0 0.0 [0.0- 2.1] 11 0 0.0 [0.0- 25.9]
Switzerland 120 1 0.8 [0.1- 4.6] 9 1 11.1 [2.0- 43.5]
Turkey 147 0 0.0 [0.0- 2.5] 10 0 0.0 [0.0- 27.8]
Total (18 flights) 2221 5 0.2 [0.1- 0.5] 79 3 3.8 [1.3- 10.6]
TA B L E  3   Secondary attack rates 
among co- passengers with no close 
contact with index case(s) on analysed 
England- bound contact- traced flights 
between 31 January 2020 and 12 March 
2020
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This study was not able to propose specific social distancing 
recommendations on aircraft or changes to the two- seat eligibility 
criteria for contact tracing. While cases beyond two rows were iden-
tified, we also cannot rule out transmission outside of the flight for 
these persons. However, the significantly higher attack rates among 
close contacts and co- travellers suggest these should be prioritised 
over persons with flight- only contact where resources are limited, 
and particularly where flight journeys are short. Such contacts are 
likely higher risk due to closer and more prolonged exposure, unlike 
unfamiliar co- passengers who are less likely to interact and face each 
other during the flight.5 With potential for asymptomatic infection 
and more than a quarter of index cases developing symptoms after 
the flight, our findings also highlight the importance of post- flight 
quarantine from high- incidence areas to prevent case importation. 
There should be continued efforts to study and communicate mod-
ifiable risk factors for transmission on flights, to inform flight plan-
ning and to help travellers make informed choices on travel abroad.
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